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GOOD STANDING 









Abstract.  Indirect  reciprocity  is  generally  considered  one  of  the  leading 
mechanisms  to  explain how  cooperation  may  emerge  by  natural  selection. The 
basic  intuition  is  that  establishing  a  reputation  of  being  a  helpful  individual 
increases the probability of being in turn helped. Two models have been proposed 
to  describe  how  indirect  reciprocity  may  work:  the  standing  model  (Sugden, 
1986/2004)  and  the  image-scoring  model  (Nowak  and  Sigmund,  1998a,b). 
Although there is evidence that the former model would perform better under a 
wide set of circumstances, it is often maintained that it requires individuals with an 
implausibly  large  capacity  of  processing  recursive  information.  In  this  paper  I 
argue that this is not actually the case. I then suggest that the information needed 
by the image-scoring model, under reasonable assumptions, may be sufficient for 
the standing model to work. Finally I emphasize that even if the hypothesis of 
indirect  reciprocity  is  unable  to  give  a  fair  account  of  the  ecological  bases  of 
cooperation, it has inspired a deal of research precious to social sciences.   
 
JEL Classification: C73, L14. 
Keywords: Cooperation, Indirect reciprocity, Good standing, Image-Scoring. 
 
 
                                                 
¨ This article was written while I was visiting at the International Centre for Economic 
Research (ICER, Turin). Kind hospitality from the Department of Economics and Finance 
“G. Prato” of the University of Turin and financial support both from ICER and the Italian 
Ministry  of  Education,  Research  Project  of  National  Interest  (Social  Capital,  corporate 
responsibility  and  performance:  the  unexplored  links,  No.  20085BHY5T)  is  gratefully 
acknowledged. I wish to thank Robert Sugden for comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
.  
   2 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decades a massive effort has been made to investigate how 
cooperation  can  evolve  by  natural  selection,  a  problem  recognized  by 
Darwin  (1859)  himself  as  crucial  for  his  theory  of  the  preservation  of 
favoured races in the struggle for life. A by-product of such an effort has 
been the development of a game-theoretical paradigm that both natural and 
social scientists have found particularly apt to address the problem.  
The development of a common paradigm has certainly contributed to 
cultivate the dream of identifying a key mechanism to explain cooperation 
in  any  possible  situation,  thus  providing  a  general  theory  applicable,  in 
principle,  to  both  natural  and  social  contexts.  This  dream  has  vanished. 
Current knowledge indeed does not provide any good reason to suppose that 
cooperation is a single phenomenon with a unified causal explanation. It 
seems indeed more plausible to view cooperation as a family of loosely-
related phenomena which may have multiple causes (Beraldo and Sugden, 
2010). 
It is now clear, for example,  that as far as cooperation is concerned, 
there are substantial differences between humans and animals.  In  animal 
societies, where some  apparently cooperative behaviours are indeed forms 
of mutualism, cooperation is mostly based on kin, being therefore quite rare 
in  groups  consisting  of  genetically  unrelated  individuals  (Clutton-Brock, 
2009). Among humans, who are endowed with higher cognitive capacities,   3 
genetic  relatedness  plays  a  minor  role,  and  cooperation  seems  better 
explained by some form of reciprocity.  
It is known, for example, that fear of retaliation carried out by one’s 
partner  may  provide  sufficient  incentives  for  cooperation  to  emerge  in 
dyadic long-term relationships (e.g. Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981; Sugden, 1986/2004).  
In large groups, where interaction with a given partner is occasional, 
reciprocity  still  provides  the  grounds  for  plausible  explanations.  For 
example: third parties observing an individual’s conduct might condition 
theirs to the actions he/she performed in previous interactions with others, 
what is usually termed indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987); decentralized 
altruistic punishment may enforce adherence to cooperative social norms, an 
hypothesis known as strong reciprocity (e.g. Gintis et al., 2005).  
Each of the aforementioned forms of reciprocity, and others that one 
might refer to (e.g. Nowak, 2006), is candidate to explain cooperation in 
given  environments,  without  being  excluded  that  different  forms  of 
reciprocity may at the same time be at work.  
In this paper the focus will be on indirect reciprocity.  
It is plausible to believe that the evolution of language – which might 
have  found  the  selective  mould  in  its  contribution  to  the  emergence  of 
cooperative  practices  (e.g.  Nowak  and  Sigmund,  2005)  -  allowing  the 
transmission of greater and better (more reliable) information, has played a   4 
decisive role in equipping humans with the ability of achieving cooperation 
via this type of reciprocity. Many social institutions and practices, such as 
gossiping for example (e.g. Sommerfeld et al. 2007) have then evolved (or 
co-evolved) to allow that any individual in a community be continually and 
effectively assessed and reassessed (Alexander, 1987).  
The good-standing model, developed by Robert Sugden (2004 / 1986), 
elegantly describes the role that status or reputation may play in ensuring 
the emergence of cooperative practices.  
Although this model has become one of the current theoretical paradigm 
to explain how cooperation might evolve via indirect reciprocity, it is often 
questioned  whether  it  does  provide  a  sensible  account  of  how  things 
realistically  go,  as  it  seems  to  require  an  implausibly  large  capacity  of 
processing recursive information  (e.g. Milinski et al., 2001; Bolton et al., 
2005;  Engelmann  &  Fischbacher,  2009).  A  competing  model,  based  on 
image-scoring,  has  been  then  suggested  as  a  more  reliable  basis  for  the 
analysis (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a).  
In this paper I analyze the properties of both the standing and the image-
scoring  models,  showing  that  the  former  does  not  actually  require 
processing recursive information. I furthermore suggest that the information 
needed  by  the  image-scoring  model,  under  plausible  assumptions,  is 
sufficient for the standing model to work.    5 
In doing this, I will refer to a recent strand of biological literature which 
has provided useful insights to assess the role that status or reputation can 
play in ensuring the adoption of cooperative practices.    
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  illustrates  the  main 
characteristics of both the standing and the image scoring model.  Section 3 
sets the scene, whereas Sections 4 and 5 formally derive the informational 
requirements for both models to work. Section 6 provides some discussion 
of the literature and concludes.  
 
2. Good Standing 
The idea of standing was first introduced by Sugden (Sugden 2004 / 
1986) in the analysis of conventions of reciprocity which allow cooperation 
to persist. The aim was to amend tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1981) in such a way as 
to  explain  cooperation  even  in  presence  of  errors  in  execution    (Sugden 
2004 / 1986, pp. 116-119). The presence of such errors may in fact lead to 
an  endless  chain  of  retaliation  and  counter-retaliation  whenever  a  strict 
adherence to the principle of tit-for-tat is kept
1. 
At the core of the standing model lies the presumption that an individual 
who  is  in  good  standing  is  entitled  to  the  cooperation  of  the  others. 
Grounding  on  this  hypothesis,  Sugden  depicts  an  environment  in  which 
                                                 
1 Suppose individuals k and j strictly adhere to a tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. Both cooperate until round t, when k defects by mistake (k intended to 
cooperate but accidentally defected). This implies j defecting in round t+1. k in turn defects 
in round t+2 and so on.   6 
every individual starts being in good standing and remains in good standing 
as long as he or she cooperates with individuals who are in good-standing as 
well.  Accidental defections are less detrimental than under a convention of 
strict reciprocity (such as tit-for-tat for example), as a good standing can be 
regained whenever an individual accepts of being punished for a number x  
of  periods  after  defection  (strategies  can  be  more  or  less  forgiving).  
Notably, defecting with an individual who is in bad standing, does not imply 
loosing one’s own good standing.  
Sugden shows that the standing strategy “Cooperate if your opponent is 
in  good  standing,  or  if  you  are  not.  Otherwise,  defect”  is  evolutionarily 
stable  if  the  rules  characterizing  the  environment  depicted  above  are  at 
work. The standing strategy is, in his words, a convention.  
This  convention  has  some  desirable  properties.  It  is  not  only  a 
convention  of  reciprocity.  It  is  also  a  convention  of  (punishment  and) 
reparation, in that it prescribes that individuals who happen to be in bad 
standing accept the defection of the individuals whom they are interacting 
with for a number x of periods without retaliating (this is what allows them 
to regain a good standing). It is, remarkably, a convention of forgiveness as 
well.   
Since  defecting  with  an  individual  who  is  in  bad  standing  does  not 
imply loosing one’s own good standing, a crucial question is why the same 
action  (defecting)    should  be  differently  assessed  when  the  status  of  the   7 
individual  who  bears  the  consequences  of  it,  changes.  In  Sugden’s 
perspective this turns out to be a matter of convention itself, so it is worth 
wondering whether there are reasons to believe that conventions of this type 
are likely to emerge. 
Indeed,  recent  evidence  suggests  that  brain  mechanisms  which  elicit 
harsh  responses  to  non-cooperative  individuals  have  evolved  to  facilitate 
advantageous social interaction.  It is known, for example, that activation in 
the dorsal striatum, a brain region implicated in the processing of rewards 
accruing  as  a  result  of  goal-directed  actions,  reflects  satisfaction  from 
punishing  defectors  (de  Quervain  et  al.,  2004).  Thus,  defecting  with  an 
individual currently in bad standing as a result of his past misconduct, is 
likely  to  stimulate  in  any  observer  an  approving  response.  The  selective 
advantage  of  this  trait  would  be  that  an  individual  in  bad  standing 
experiencing  punishment  is  less  prone  to  cheat  in  future  interactions 
involving the observer.  
There are many historical examples of conventions based on the maxim 
“do  not  to  consider  a  cheater  whoever  cheated  an  individual  caught 
cheating”; a prominent one was highlighted by Greif (1989) in his analysis 
of agency problems among the Maghribi traders.  
Although  plausible,  the  hypothesis  that  an  individual’s  behaviour  is 
contingent  on  the  standing  of  those  with  whom  he  interacts,  has  been 
criticized on the grounds that it would require possessing an implausible   8 
amount of information. A competing model, based on image-scoring, has 
then been proposed as a more reliable basis for cooperation to emerge via 
indirect  reciprocity  (Nowak  and  Sigmund,  1998a,  1998b).  This  model 
assumes that each player has an image score which depends on his past 
behaviour. Track is kept of the image score of any individual within the 
community, and behaviour is supposed to be contingent on it. However - 
and this is the crucial difference with the standing model - the image score 
of any individual  is affected only by the actions he performs, and not by the 
status of the individuals who happen to be the receivers of such actions.  
In the next Sections I first present the basic model generally used to 
address  the  problem  of  indirect  reciprocity,  then  I  highlight  the 
informational  requirements  for  both  the  standing  and  the  image-scoring 
models to work. A discussion follows. 
 
3. Setting the scene 
Let us consider a population made up by i = 1,…, n individuals, with the 
option  of  helping  one  another,  and  let  us  suppose  that  at  any  time                   
(t = 1,…), g random pairs of individuals are chosen, one as a potential donor 
of some altruistic act, the other as a potential recipient. Let  
t and Ρ
t be 
respectively the set of donors and recipients at t, with typical elements kÎ 
t 
and j Î Ρ
t , and let us suppose that the altruistic act implies a cost c to the   9 
donor k, but confers a benefit b to the recipient j (b > c). Refusing help 
implies zero payoffs both for the donor and the recipient.  
When an individual is chosen as a donor at t, such an individual must 
perform an action a
ktÎ {C, D}, where C stands for cooperation (help) and D 
for defection (not help). In models of indirect reciprocity it is assumed that 
this action conforms to a strategy which is conditional to the current status 
of the potential recipient




it Î{C, D}, where σ
t = [σ
1t,…, σ
nt] is the current 
status profile.  
Let  us  consider,  for  any  random  encounter  (k,j)  at  t  =  m,  the  triplet                    
ω
(k, j, m) = (a
km, σ
km, σ
jm), recording the action a
km performed by k with status 
σ
km in an interaction with a potential recipient j with status σ
jm . All the 
relevant  information about the g interactions  at t = m is then given by an 
information profile of the type ω
m=[ω
(k, j, m)] m m j k R Î D Î , ,  which is a row of the 
matrix   (t)  = [ω
t] t =1,…,m keeping track of the whole information about the 
history of the game at t = m+1. Note that   (t) is not just a list of the actions 
performed by each individual. It also records who performed a particular 
action and to whom it was directed. In other words   (t) records that k with 
status σ
km performed an action affecting the well-being of j with status σ
jm, 
for any (k, j) at any t.   
                                                 
2 A strategy may be contingent on the status of both (either) the potential donor and (or) the 
potential recipient (e.g. Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a).   10 
Strategies based on reciprocity commonly give rise to two types of error 
(let us suppose they occur with probability ε
1 and ε
2 respectively). The first 
(error in execution) occurs when k plays a
kt = (C, D), when γ
k would require 
to  play  a
kt  =  (C,  D)  instead,  with  a
kt  ≠  a
kt.  The  second  (error  in 
perception) takes place when i reads  ω
(k, j, t) instead of  w
(k, j, t) , with  w
(k, j, t) 
≠ ω
(k, j, t) , acting consequently on the basis of the wrong information.  
Finally note that slight modification of the rules governing the setting 
depicted above leads to intriguing social dilemmas. Indeed, assuming that 
both players may act simultaneously as donor of each other, the interaction 
displays  the  classical  structure  of  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  set  of  individuals  is  hypothesized  as  having  the 
opportunity of donating, at any t,  either in favour of a randomly chosen j,  
or in favour of the community, the game exhibits, in the former case, the 
structure of the mutual-aid game (Sugden, 1986/2004, pp. 127-32), in the 
latter case the typical structure of  a public  good game  (e.g. Bowles and 
Gintis, 2010).  
 
4. Informational requirements 
A common argument against the standing model is that it hypothesizes 
individuals with an implausible large memory capacity (e.g. Milinski et al., 
2001). Indeed  a potential donor k should not only know the behaviour of j 
in his last interaction as a donor, i.e. whether j cooperated or defected; as k’s   11 
behaviour has to be contingent on j’s standing, k should be aware of the 
standing  of  j',  the  potential  recipient  with  whom  j  last  interacted  as  a 
potential donor. As the standing of j' depended on the choice made when j' 
acted as potential donor of j'', k should be aware of j''’s standing at the time, 
and so on.  
The ability to both record and process higher-order information is a very 
demanding  condition.  If this ability  were really required by the standing 
model, its  plausibility would be indubitably undermined. However, there 
are  reasons  to  believe  that,  to  implement  a  standing  strategy,  recursive 
information might not be necessary;  first-order information might actually 
be enough. 
To see why, let Γ be the set of rules governing the evolution of status 
within the population, and suppose that there exist a mechanism Ξ(Γ) that, 
using Γ to process the information contained in   (t),  accurately records the 
status of any individual σ
t(Ξ(Γ)) = [σ
1t(Ξ(Γ)),…, σ
nt(Ξ(Γ))] at the beginning 
of the t
th period, where σ
it(Ξ(Γ))  takes on one of two values (e.g. Nowak 
and Sigmund, 1998b), that is 1 (good) and 0 (bad).  
The standing model supposes the following rules (Γ
s) for the evolution 
of status (Sugden 1986/2004, pp.118): Γ1
s) everyone starts being in good 
standing; Γ2
s) an individual loses his good standing if he fails to help a 
recipient  who  is  in  good  standing;  Γ3
s)  the  decision  of  not  helping  a 
potential recipient has no effect on an individual’s standing whenever the   12 
potential recipient is in bad standing; Γ4
s) an individual regains his good 
standing by offering help when he gets the possibility of doing so.  
Let us consider an individual i following the standing strategy γ
i(s), that 
is: “offer help when not in good standing or when the recipient is in good 
standing; otherwise do not offer help”. Individual i is always recorded as 
being in good standing by Ξ(Γ
s) if two conditions are met: ε




s)) "t. The first condition requires the absence of errors in execution 
(note however that if ε
1 > 0, i can regain a good standing by unconditionally 
cooperating  after  having  mistakenly  defected).  The  second  condition 
basically requires the absence of errors in perception, in that it demands that 
the information available to i about the status at t of any other individual in 
the population, conforms to the status that Ξ(Γ
s) would provide. 
  Assuming  ε
1 = 0, to successfully implement a standing strategy it is 
therefore necessary that σ
t(i) = σ
t(Ξ(Γ
s)) at any t. This condition requires 
that, at any t, i possesses consistent information about the current status of 
any individual, as the potential recipient with whom i interacts is randomly 
drawn from the whole population. However, consistent information about  
status does not necessarily derive from the kind of recursive information 
about actions referred to above.  
To fix the ideas, let us suppose that there exists a rule Λ which allows i 
to update σ
t(i) grounding on some information (θ
t) currently available at t, 
and consider the following definition: Λ is said to conform to Γ, if σ




kt (i) = σ
kt (Ξ(Γ)). In words: if i has consistent 
information  about  the  status  of  k  at  t,  following  Λ  will  end  up  with 
consistent information about the status of k at t + 1.  
Among the rules that i might follow, consider the simple one Λ
s: “ if: 
Λ1
s) a
kt = C then σ
kt+1 (i) = 1; Λ2
s) a
kt = D then σ
kt+1(i) = σ
kt (i) whenever 
σ
jt(i) = 0; Λ3
s) a
kt = D then σ
kt+1(i) = 0 whenever σ
jt(i) = 1”.  
First note that, so defined, Λ
s does conform to the rules governing the 
evolution of standing
3, therefore: σ
t (i) = σ
t (Ξ(Γ
s)) at some t, implies σ
t+1 (i | 
Λ
s) = σ
 t+1  (Ξ(Γ
s)). As by assumption σ
1(i) = σ
1(Ξ(Γ
s)) = [1,…,1], by the 
principle of induction σ
t (i | Λ
s) = σ
t (Ξ(Γ
s)) at any t.  
So,  following  Λ
s,  information  about  both  actions  and  current  status 
provide  the  basis  for  successfully  implementing  the  standing  strategy, 
without any need to process recursive information about actions.  
 
5. Who is being helped (or not)? 
In a recent paper, Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) have argued that a 
shortcoming  of  the  model  by  Nowak  and  Sigmund  (1998a),  based  on 
image-scoring,  is  that  it  does  not  make  use  of  higher-order  information.  
According  to  them,  to  explain  why  reciprocal  individuals  survive  in  the 
                                                 
3  To  see  this,    consider  a  pair  of  interacting  individuals  at  t,  and  suppose  that  σ
t(i)  =  
σ
t(Ξ(Γ
s)),  Hence: 
a
kt = C → σ
kt+1 (i | Λ
s) = σ
kt+1 (Ξ(Γ








s)) = 0, a
kt = D → σ
kt+1 (i | Λ
s) = σ




s)) (by:  
Λ2
s; Γ3




s)) = 1, a
kt = D  → σ
kt+1 (i | Λ
s) = σ
kt+1 (Γ
s) = 0 (by: Λ3
s; Γ2
s).   14 
presence  of  non-reciprocal  strategic  ones,  it  is  in  fact  necessary  to 
discriminate between those who punish free-riders and those who free-ride 
themselves. If higher-order information were available, they argue, then the 
standing strategy may provide a consistent explanation for the evolution of 
cooperation via indirect reciprocity . 
There are reasons to believe that Engelmann & Fischbacher (2009)’s 
criticism is misplaced. As shown before, the  real difference between the 
standing model and the one based on image-scoring, in not given by the 
availability of recursive information.  
As the amount of information needed by image-scoring is of the same 
order than that required by standing, the divergence between the two models 
is  ultimately  grounded  on  different  assumptions  about  the  possibility  of 
observing who is being either helped or not helped. 
There are two main variants of the image scoring model. Without any 
loss of generality, in what follows I consider the one proposed by Nowak 
and Sigmund (1998a). This model supposes the following rules (Γ
IS) for the 
evolution of status: Γ1
IS) at t = 1 each player i has an image score s
it = 0; 
Γ2
IS) the image score increases (decreases) by one unit  whenever a player, 
chosen as a donor, cooperates (does not cooperate);  Γ3
IS) the image score 
of a recipient does not change.   15 
 In this model, a strategy for a potential donor k is generally represented 
by a threshold h
k, and is of the type: “provide help to j if s
jt ≥ h
k”
 4.  
Suppose ε
1 = 0, and consider the mechanism Ξ(Γ
IS), using Γ
IS (the rules 
governing  the  attribution  of  scores  in  the  population)    to  process  the 
information contained in   (t), in order to keep track of the score of any 
individual at the beginning of the t
th period. 
 In  its  more  general  formulation,  the  model  assumes  that  the  whole 
information about scores is public, therefore σ
t(i) = σ
t(Ξ(Γ)) for any i at any 
t. This latter equality presupposes that any i is able to observe the action of 




 such as Λ
IS:  “ if: Λ1
IS) a
kt = C then σ
kt+1  = σ
kt + 1; Λ2
IS) 
a
kt = D then σ
kt+1(i) = σ
kt – 1; Λ3
IS) σ
jt+1  = σ
jt”. 
To follow Λ
IS, every player i, at any t, has to know both the current 
status of any other individual in the population and the action performed by 
any potential donor. As seen in the previous Section, this information would 
however be enough to implement the standing strategy as well, unless it is 
                                                 
4 The other variant (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b) hypothesizes only two image scores: 0 
for someone who defected last round, 1 for someone who cooperated. So, the only thing 
which might be of interest for a potential donor at t, is how a potential recipient behaved at  
t – 1. However, as an individual is in bad status at t whenever he or she did not provide help 
at t -1, providing help at t -1 may be a decision entirely determined by strategic reputation 
building. In other words, as it is difficult to infer the motivations behind an act of helping, it 
is difficult to understand whether the decision of benefiting a potential recipient is driven 
by either indirect reciprocity or strategic considerations about one’s own status. 
5  To  see  this,    consider  a  pair  of  interacting  individuals  at  t,  and  suppose  that  σ
t(i)  =  
σ
t(Ξ(Γ
IS)),  Hence: 
a
kt = C → σ
kt+1 (i | Λ
IS)  = σ






kt = D → σ
kt+1 (i | Λ
IS)  = σ







jt+1 (i | Λ






   16 
(implicitly) assumed that, for any given interaction, it is not recognizable to 
whom  the  (observable)  action  of  the  potential  donor  is  directed.  The 
ultimate difference between the two competing models is here: in the image-
scoring model, the identity of the receiver remains unknown.  
This assumption is however quite controversial. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine an individual observing someone not providing help without being 
aware of the individual who is not actually being helped. As biologists are 
interested in the selection of genetically hard-wired traits which evolved to 
equip homo sapiens with the ability to achieve high levels of cooperation, 
they are interested in those mechanisms which may have been presumably 
at work in small hunter-gatherer societies, rarely composed by more than 
one  hundred  individuals.  In  such  communities,  information  about  the 
identity of the receiver of a given act of cooperation (defection)  was likely 
to be available. From this perspective, the implicit assumption that makes 
the informational requirement for image-scoring not sufficient to implement 
good standing, seems not taking properly into account the characteristics of 
the phenomenon it wants to explain. 
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Modelling indirect reciprocity is a complex task. This is why analytical 
treatment is rare (notable exceptions being Sugden , 1986/2004; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998b), and  researchers rely either on computer simulations or on   17 
laboratory experiments.   Analyses based on computer simulations generally 
assume that, for any generation, g donor-recipient pairs are chosen. Each 
individual is endowed with a strategy, and - unless mutation occurs -  at the 
end  of  each  generation  individuals  of  any  given  type  leave  offspring  in 
proportion  to  their  payoff.  More  successful  strategies  spread  into  the 
population and possibly go to fixation.  
Martin  Nowak  and  Karl  Sigmund  (1998a)  were  the  first  to  perform 
extensive computer simulations to test whether indirect reciprocity may in 
principle  be  considered  a  reliable  mechanism  for  the  evolution  of 
cooperation. Although their analysis has provided some useful insights - for 
example it has made clear that the number of encounters per generation has 
to  be  adequate  to  the  rules  governing  the  transmission  of  valuable 
information  within  the  population  -  their  framework,  based  on  image-
scoring, has proved, to following tests, not fully adequate.  
Leimar  and  Hammerstein  (2001),  for  example,  have  argued  that  the 
success  of  image-scoring  strategies,  which,  although  not  evolutionarily 
stable may allow cooperative regimes to persist for most of the time,  is the 
result  of  restrictive  conditions,  unlikely  to  be  representative  of  historical 
human societies. In particular they argue that Nowak and Sigmund’s study 
crucially  hypothesises  an  implausibly  small  cost  to  benefit  ratio  of  the 
altruistic act.    18 
Similarly,  Panchanathan  and  Boyd  (2003),  by  running  computer 
simulations using a variant of the image-scoring model (provided by Nowak 
and Sigmund, 1998b) found that cooperation based on image-scoring cannot 
evolve  if,  as  it  is  likely,  ε
1  >  0,  that  is,  if  individuals  commit  errors  in 
execution.  
Both the latter mentioned studies find that the standing strategy, which 
discriminate  between  justified  and  unjustified  defection,  can  instead  be 
evolutionarily stable. In any case, even when not evolutionarily stable, the 
standing strategy is found to have superior properties with respect to any 
strategy based on image scoring.  
The  importance  of  distinguishing  between  justified  and  unjustified 
defection  was  strengthened  by  Ohtsuki  and  Iwasa  (2004),  whose  study 
considered  4096  possible  strategies  built  by  taking  into  account  all  the 
possible combinations between individuals’ status and conceivable rules to 
assess  actions.  They  found  that  only  eight  of  such  strategies  are 
evolutionarily stable and lead to cooperation, even when b is only slightly 
higher  than  c.  Remarkably,  the  leading  eight  shares  an  important 
characteristic: all of them regard as good any defection against individuals 
with a bad status.  
In a similar vein, computer simulations run by Takahashi and Mashima 
(2006)  suggest  that  may  be  important  to  consider  not  only  strategies 
regarding  as  good  the  behaviour  of  individuals  not  helping  those  in  bad   19 
status.  When  perceptual  errors  are  subjective,  for  a  strategy  to  be 
evolutionarily stable it is required that those giving help to individuals in 
bad  standing  are  considered  in  bad  standing  as  well.  In  other  words, 
depending on the characteristics of the perceptual error (whether objective 
or subjective) two different conventions may arise: the enemy of my enemy 
is my friend; the friend of my enemy is my enemy as well.  
It  is  worth  noting  that  recent  simulations  by  Rankin  and  Eggimann 
(2009) suggest that within the framework provided by the standing model 
there is a much larger range of benefits over which judgement bias towards 
bad acts   is favoured.   
Even  if  the  evidence  in  favour  of  the  good  standing  model  is 
overwhelming in computer simulations, prudence requires to take properly 
into  account  the  limits  of  the  method.  As  outlined  by  Leimar  and 
Hammerstein (2001), the main advantage of simulations is that they can 
handle complex situations that otherwise might defy analysis; however, a 
reasonable  attitude  towards  evolutionary  simulations  could  be  to  accept 
them as useful, but to view results obtained in this way with a fair amount of 
carefulness (scepticism, Leimar and Hammerstein say, at least when it is not 
entirely clear what factors were responsible for the results).   
To  investigate  whether  cooperation  may  be  sustained  by  indirect 
reciprocity and how indirect reciprocity does work, it is wise to consider 
which kind of information is in practice available to individuals and how   20 
they  make  use  of  such  information.  In  this  respect,  recourse  to  lab  may 
provide useful insights.  
However,  until  now,  although  laboratory  experiments  have  offered  a 
consistent body of evidence showing that helpful individuals are more likely 
to be in turn helped by third parties (e.g. Wedekind and Milinsky, 2000; 
Milinski  et  al.,  2002),  that  is,  although  they  have  found  evidence  that 
indirect reciprocity does work in practice, they have not provided sufficient 
evidence to settle the issue of which kind of convention is likely to emerge 
(given plausible assumptions on information availability). This is perhaps a 
consequence of experiment-designs generally grounded on the belief that 
(Milinki  et  al.,  2001,  p.2500)  “in  adopting  a  standing  strategy,  a  large 
amount  of  second-  if  not  third-  and  fourth-order  information  about  the 
history of the social interactions of many potential receivers of help has to 
be  stored  and  used…standing  strategies  might  be  too  demanding  to  be 
realized with respect to memory capacity”.  
This belief is widespread, as witnessed, for example, by the studies of 
Bolton et al. (2005) - which has provided evidence that individuals do make 
use of recursive information when available, with this in turn increasing 
cooperation  -  and  Engelmann  and  Fischbacher  (2009)  -  whose  analysis 
suggests that indirect reciprocity based on image scoring leads to strategic 
reputation building which in turn depresses cooperation.   21 
Adam  Smith  (1763/1978)  was  the  first  to  suggest  that  cooperative 
practices emerge whenever the cost of acquiring a good reputation is more 
than offset by the material gains accruing from it. Any economist would still 
agree that the need of displaying a good image is (at least partially) driven 
by the desire of reaping the fruits accruing from market interaction. A good 
standing or image, in other words, pays. 
As the development of a far than rudimentary language is a necessary 
condition  for  large  scale  cooperation  based  on  it,  indirect  reciprocity  is 
certainly  not  suitable  to  provide  a  convincing  explanation  for  the 
widespread level of cooperation observed in nature (e.g. de Waal., 2006).  In 
a  forthcoming  book,  Sam  Bowles  and  Herbert  Gintis  (2010)  argue  that 
indirect reciprocity is also unable to give account of the evolution of the 
biological traits which make humans a cooperative species, since, as soon as 
human  communities  get  larger,  high  quality  information  is  no  more 
available and the rate of errors in perception becomes excessively high for 
indirect reciprocity to work. 
As emphasized in the Introduction to this article, cooperation is not a 
single phenomenon with a unified causal explanation. Even if a form of 
reciprocity  based  on  status  or  reputation  is  inadequate  to  provide  a 
consistent account of the biological bases of our attitude to cooperate, there 
are reasons to believe that it helps in drawing a reliable picture of the forces 
sustaining cooperative practices in many social and economic environments.   22 
In this respect, the standing model, starting from more realistic hypotheses 
about human behaviour, seems to be the preferred candidate to catch the 
basic aspects of how reputation works and is affected by one’s conduct.  
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